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Introduction 
The growth of the weight of East Asia and Southeast Asia (hereinafter: the Far 
East) in the world economy seems unstoppable. For this macro-region, which is 
becoming the number one economic centre of the world, Europe is the second 
largest trade partner after North America. Due to its specific production culture 
and scarce natural resources, the procurement and trade sales markets of the Far 
East are mostly different geographically (also by continents). 
This short paper is only an examination of what are the natural, economic, 
political and logistical criteria of the goods transportation between the Far East, a 
region more and more appreciated in the foreign trade of Hungary and Europe on 
both traditional and newly created routes. For Hungary, a landlocked country, it 
does matter what routes can offer transportation, which is the most favourable 
from economic aspects and also the most reliable. In our paper, besides the 
analysis of infrastructure and goods flows in the Western Europe/EU/Far East 
relations, we also outline the possible directions and means of Hungary’s joining 
the trans-Eurasian land and combined (sea/land) routes. 
1 Generators and scales of traffic on sea and land routes 
To simplify the issue, transportation between Europe and the Far East can use two 
sea routes (the hardly used one on the Arctic Ocean and the dominant south peri-
Asian leading across the Suez Canal), and a total of three trans-Eurasian railway 
corridors are available for shipping. 
In the time of mechanised transportation, road vehicles have had absolutely no 
or only marginal role until recently, as opposed to railway and sea shipping, in 
the transcontinental Far East–Europe transportation spanning extreme distances. 
The international transit routes, which are in poor condition in many places, are 
only used in certain sections, up to not more than a few hundred or one thousand 
kilometres (IRF Seidenstrassen… 2008). Air cargo transport, with an extremely 
slow pace of development, is negligible as yet, considering the transport volume. 
In the generation of the total volume of cargo traffic, the European Union, 
Russia and China play a dominant role; the other non-EU member European 
countries have a secondary role, as do the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
There is also a tertiary factor (by the extensions of the southern side corridor): 
Iran and Turkey. The faraway Indian subcontinent has a marginal significance 
compared to its economic performance, due to the complicated nature of joining 
the West–East corridor from the peninsula. 
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The largest sender and receiver of goods in the Far East is China; only 3.4% of 
its export volume reaches the European Union on the land corridors, the rest is 
transported on the sea (Table 1). 
The decline of the import needs of the European Union struck by a prolonged 
crisis, and the slowing down of the economic growth of China are expected to 
have an unfavourable impact on the development of the volume of railway cargo 
traffic between Europe and the Far East. 
Table 1 
Breakdown of cargo traffic between the EU 27 and China by transport routes: 
railway corridors and the sea route, 2010–2020 
Corridors To Europe To China Percentage 
change in 
2010–2020, to in 2010 in 2020 in 2010 in 2020 
1,000 
tons 
% 1,000 
tons 
% 1,000 
tons 
% 1,000 
tons 
% Europe China 
TransSiba) 669 1.4 7,438 8.0 419 1.4 2,239 7.5 +6.4 +6.1 
TransSib–
Kazakhstan 
747 1.6 5,520 5.9 463 1.5 1,741 5.8 +4.3 +4.3 
Central corridor 129 0.3 4,086 4.3 78 0.3 1,246 4.1 +4.0 +3.8 
TRACECA 58 0.1 1,172 1.2 38 0.1 379 1.3 +1.2 +1.2 
Railway total 1,603 3.4 18,215 19.5 998 3.3 5,703 18.7 +16.1 +15.4 
Sea route 45,859 96.6 75,150 80.5 29,538 96.3 24,831a) 81.3 –16.1 –15.0 
Grand total 47,462 100.0 93,366 100.0 30,536 100.0 30,534b) 100.0 – – 
Notes: a) – With no information whether this also involves the traffic of the TransSib–Mongolia and 
the TransSib–Manchuria side corridors, or is only valid for the trunk route in Russia. If so, then 
a considerable part of the traffic of the total TransSib system is excluded from the table. On the 
basis of other data it is hardly believable that the traffic of the TransSib–Kazakhstan corridor 
burdened by a break of gauge exceeds that of the TransSib route in both directions; b) – It is 
probably the numerical mistake of the original source which results in the impossible figures, 
i.e. that the volume of the total traffic is just equal in 2020 to that in 2010 and that the weight of 
sea shipping decreases. 
Source: Calculated and constructed by the authors, on the basis of the tons featured in RETRACK 
(2012) Tables 91 and 92. 
Taking the foreign trade of the other countries into consideration, we estimate 
the flow of goods between the Far East and Europe to range between 65 and 70 
million tons in 2012 in the western direction and at least 40–45 million tons 
eastwards. 
An ever larger proportion of goods are shipped in containers. Asia has become 
in the last quarter of a century the most important actor and region in world trade 
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as regards the volume of containers shipped on sea (Erdősi 2010b). Asian ports 
managed only 25% of the container traffic of the world in 1980, and their share 
grew to 52% by 2010. This process is reflected in the development of the volume 
of traffic in the Far East–Europe relation: 
 The traffic volume of containers from the Far East to the ports of Western 
Europe grew by 80% between 2000 and 2006, and reached 7.5 million 
TEUs by 2006. Traffic on the opposite direction (West–East) was approxi-
mately 4 million TEUs; 
 The volume of goods transported by ships from the Far East to the ports of 
the Mediterranean Sea was 3 million TEUs in 2006, while the volume of 
the containers shipped in the opposite direction was 1 million TEU 
(RETRACK, 2012). 
These figures reveal the advantage of the Far East over Europe as regards the 
mass of export transportations. This advantage is the strongest over Southern 
Europe that is least able to compensate with its moderate export the mass of 
goods imported from the Far East. The ports of the Mediterranean (including its 
constituent seas) also handle goods transport of the Carpathian Basin and the 
Southeast European–Alpine region, which is especially import to these areas 
(Erdősi 2005, 2008). 
2 A supplementing or a substituting role? 
The advantages of the peri-continental sea shipping, passing by Eurasia from the 
South, over the transcontinental transport routes running from East to West across 
the Eurasian continent can be seen in several aspects (expenses, reliability, and 
capacity). Despite the improvements made on the land corridors (especially the 
TransSib) and the shortened transport time, sea navigation has been able to 
maintain a 98% share from goods transport over the last two decades. 
The transport linkage (and also semi-global logistics mega-turntable) function 
of Russia between Europe and the Far East is basically served by the system of 
trans-Eurasian railway corridors. As regards the volume of goods transported, this 
“land bridge” has had a modest auxiliary function in comparison with sea 
navigation so far. Nevertheless it may even have some substituting role in certain 
geographical and sub-sectoral segments of the transport market, because 
 in the transportation of “weather sensitive” goods or ones sensitive to the 
salty sea air (Truel 2011), but also because 
 after the rearrangement of the locations of the main Far East departures and 
destinations it is not the islands with no other choice than sea navigation 
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(Japan and Taiwan) but continental China which is the largest generator of 
traffic, and for China railway linkages may have a growing attraction; 
 the railway companies of Russia and other countries will be able, by 
significant technical developments and the creation of well organised 
transport chains, to further decrease the duration and price of shipments and 
also make them so much safer that some of the transportation clients may 
choose railway instead of sea navigation. 
The farther the point of departure and the destination of the shipment from the 
sea ports, the better the chance for land transportation to have a substituting role. 
For example, it is usually not economical to transport export goods produced in 
South China across the busy inland railway network to the TransSib or the central 
trans-Asian corridors and then to Europe; it is more reasonable to ship them from 
the nearest sea ports to the faraway destinations. 
The efficiency of the elements of railways and roads are significantly 
influenced by ownership and organisational relations. As regards the latter, Russia 
and the Central Asian CIS countries have already made the first steps for reform. 
Although in most countries the free access to the services market has already 
become legally possible for other domestic and foreign companies, only a few 
have used this opportunity so far. In most countries, there is still a monopoly that 
is an obstacle to the renewal of the railway, both in technical and operational 
aspects (UNECE… 2012). 
3 The major general problems of transportation on the land 
corridors 
The factors influencing the efficiency of the operation of the trans-Eurasian trans-
port corridors, their usability (and their competitiveness against sea navigation 
after all) include 
 water routes across the landlocked seas and large lakes interrupting the 
continuity of land routes (Black and Caspian sea, Lake Van); 
 special technical norms making the continuous transport of trains 
impossible (track gauges, voltages, different axial pressures) and the poor 
condition of infrastructure; 
 border crossing and customs procedures different by border crossing 
stations and countries, and also various administrative solutions that often 
increase the time of transportation considerably (by 30–50%) (ECMT… 
2004); 
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 unnecessary bypass routes to be constructed because of the political 
tensions among the countries, leading to increased route length and running 
time (e.g. the bypass of Armenia); 
 one of the biggest challenges for all means of transport is to secure an 
acceptable level of safety of life and, above all, property. In this respect, 
some achievements have been made in the field of the protection of railway 
transports (by the employment of armed guards), but the situation in road 
transportation is much more worrying (despite the application of GPS 
devices), not to mention pipelines that are often damaged and drained 
(Transit and International… 2004). 
One of the most serious difficulties of these is the lack of interoperability on 
the railway corridors. The trans-Eurasian corridors are only interoperable, as 
regards the technical parameters and the order of operation, in the successor states 
of the Soviet Union, while the networks adjoining them from Europe or China use 
different systems. The biggest problem resulting from the lack of interoperability 
is the difference in the track gauges, the overcoming/bridging of which (by 
reloading or the change of bogies) is extremely costly. The lack of interoperability 
is also seen in the differences among the lengths of the trains. The cargo trains 
running in Russia, the states of the Caucasus or Central Asia are one and a half 
times longer than in the connected European partner countries or in China. This 
means that the load of a train from a CIS country cannot be transported by a 
European train designed for the standard European tracks (Merger… 2012). 
3.1 The situation and perspectives of the landlocked Central Asian countries 
for the use of the Eurasian transport lines 
The peripheries of the former Soviet Union, mainly coming from their location/ 
geographical features, have many disadvantages in transport, caused by the diffi-
culty to reach sea ports (the country is forced to use sea ports abroad at con-
siderable extra costs, difficulties of crossing the state borders), and also by the 
natural endowments which make the construction and maintenance of land trans-
port difficult or expensive (deserts, semi deserts or high mountains). In order to 
alleviate the problems, good partnership relations are necessary among the 
respective countries (China, Iran, Russia etc.), not only in the political dimension 
but also for effective economic/infrastructural cooperation. Some formal steps 
have already been taken in this field. One of the biggest challenges for the pro-
motion of the trade among several countries along the Southern Route 
/TRACECA is the implementation of the harmonisation of the national customs 
procedures. The six countries of the CAREC, Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
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Mongolia) and China officially created the theoretical basis for the simplification 
of the checks and administrative activities at the border crossing stations by 
making a TIR agreement on international transportation and bi- and multilateral 
agreements on jointly made and simplified customs procedures, but the efficiency 
of the agreements can hardly be felt in real life (www.carecprogram.org, TIR 
Handbook, 2010). Despite the many bi- and multilateral agreements, the official 
cost of crossing the border ranges between 10.6% and 39% of the total transport 
expenses, while the non-official contributions (tips paid into the hands of officers) 
amount to 33% of the official sums on the average. These expenses also weaken 
the competitiveness of the landlocked countries on the world market (Transport 
links… 2006). In addition to the subjective factors, the impacts of the objective 
ones are even more unfavourable in some cases. The transport costs often reach 
40% of the sales price of goods transported by lorries or trucks, which, however, 
is not only the consequence of the large transport distances but also of the cargo 
fees exceeding those of the advanced countries by 70%. A very much problematic 
factor in this respect is that the bulk of the export from the inland countries con-
sists of bulk goods, raw materials that have a large physical volume for their spe-
cific value (e.g. cotton or wool), or, besides being bulky, they even have a big 
weight (e.g. petroleum products, ores, other mining products or in some cases 
cereals). For these products, the transport costs calculated for their specific weight 
are very high, weakening their competitiveness (Joint Study on Developing… 
2008). 
4 Function of the trans-Eurasian railway corridors, the 
connections they create and the features of their infrastructure 
4.1 Characteristics of the infrastructure of the respective corridors 
4.1.1  The TransSib corridor system 
The northernmost corridor joining the Pan-European (PEN) Corridor II is the 
Russian TransSib trunk corridor (Moscow–Vladivostok), which, in the quality, 
practical value and capacity of infrastructure, exceeds all other corridors by far 
(Figure 1, Table 2). Its outstandingly favourable features from technical and 
transport operational aspects include that from the Polish/Belarus border right to 
the Sea of Japan, there is a single (wide) gauge, double track railway line, elec-
trified in its full length, suitable for the transportation of trains that are definitely 
heavy (5 thousand tons) and may be longer than one kilometre. The voltages used 
for traction have not been standardised so far, so the locomotives must be  
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changed in several places even within Russia, or much more expensive, multi-
voltage locomotives must be used. Its unfavourable features include that the lar-
ger part of its capacity is occupied by the foreign trade transport (and also per-
sonal transport) needs of large cities and mining and industrial zones touched by 
the railway line or located along its side-branches, so in order for the route to 
meet the possibly increasing transit function (Table 1), further capacity enlarge-
ments and modernisations will be necessary. 
The TransSib trunk corridor is the dominant transport corridor in the Europe–
Far East relation, whose backbone consists of the Brest–Vladivostok route, but 
whose European side-branches from the Baltic Region and St. Petersburg, and 
also from South Poland/Ukraine reach the main route west of the Volga River or 
in the Ural Mountains area (Trans-Asian Railway 2012). 
From the south branch of the TransSib trunk line, the “TransSib–Kazakhstan 
side corridor” runs out in southeast direction at Petropavlovsk in West Siberia, 
crossing Kazakhstan (and touching the new capital city, Astana), which is con-
tinued in China and leads to the ports of the Bohai Bay/Yellow Sea, after a 
forking behind Lanzhou. The international significance of this side-corridor is 
given by the linking of three countries. For the foreign trade of Kazakhstan, as an 
infrastructure tool allowing the integration into the global economy, it provides an 
eastward access to the world seas, and also creates a direct connection to its most 
prestigious partner, Russia that is the most important both from political and eco-
nomic aspects. A disfavourable aspect of the technical and operational features is 
the relatively low proportion of electrified and double track routes compared to 
the other side-corridors (Table 2), but the biggest obstacle to the continuous 
traffic is the lack of up-to-date technical linkage between the wide and the narrow 
gauge networks at the border crossing station of Dostyk/Alashankau (Eurasian 
Land Bridge… 2012). 
The “TransSib–Mongolia side corridor” running across Mongolia in a 
southeast direction branches out from the trunk corridor in the vicinity of the East 
Siberian Ulan Ude, with the same wide gauge and then continued with normal 
gauge in China right to Beijing. This railway, in addition to providing a “lifeline” 
for Mongolia, a country heavily dependant upon Russia and lately also on China 
supplying vegetable food, is also the most ideal route of the trade between Russia 
and the central part of China, as this is the wide gauge track most approaching the 
Chinese metropolitan region. Its advantage from a technical aspect is that it is 
almost 90% electrified and equipped with two parallel rails (the Mongolian sec-
tion has only one rail). 
The “TransSib–Manchuria” side corridor stemming out in southeast direction 
from the trunk corridor east of Chita is continued in Manchuria. Due to its junc-
tions within Manchuria (eastward and southward), this is the geopolitically most 
sensitive TransSib side corridor. Running in an eastward direction across Man-
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churia, it offers a short transit route via Ussuriysk to the Russian port complex of 
the Vladivostok region (Vostochny, Nahodka). The Manchurian is the eastern-
most TransSib side corridor system, which, despite the two breaks of gauge, is 
attractive for Russia because of its short length for both export/import and transit 
shipments (even besides the fee to be paid to China for the use of the railway), as 
opposed to the much longer line running only in Russian areas (in the vicinity of 
the Amur River). In addition, it is an infrastructure promoting the heavy industry 
cooperations between Manchuria and Russia. In addition to serving Russian and 
Chinese interests, the side branch of this side corridor is of vital importance for 
the international land transportation relations of North Korea (Figure 2, cutout), 
and also for South Korea in the future if the border between the two Koreas will 
be opened permanently (Barrow 2007). 
4.1.2 The central trans-Eurasian corridor 
South of the TransSib, but passing by the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, there is 
this railway corridor running to China via [Bratislava]–Chop–Donetsk–
Volgograd–Aksarayskaya–Dostyk. It is a corridor consisting of lines from four 
countries, of which three are wide gauge tracks. The only connection to the 
Chinese normal gauge network at Dostyk is used by this corridor as well. The 
mission of the central corridor is to create a transcontinental transportation possi-
bility on a shorter route between the northern part of the Carpathian Basin and 
West China across the south part of the Sarmatian Plain and Kazakhstan (passing 
by the TransSib). Russia is evidently counter-interested in this, although the cen-
tral corridor is far from being a real competitor of the TransSib, as the technical 
problems considerably limit the meeting of the expectations, as just over one-third 
of the route is electrified, and the total of the double-track sections lags far behind 
the trunk line and the side lines of the TransSib network. As regards reliability, 
the side line branching out at Bucharest is the most problematic, as it leads across 
the politically unstable Transnistria in Moldavia. It would be reasonable to create 
a common hub for the Carpathian Basin and its foreground. The most suitable 
location for this purpose – taking, among other things, the transport demands of 
the regional automotive industry into consideration – seems to be Bratislava 
(RETRACK… 2012). 
4.1.3 The TRACECA 
By signing the TRACECA multilateral agreement aiming at the implementation 
of this southernmost trans-Eurasian land corridor, the European Union’s goal was 
to integrate this corridor into the TEN-T, in order to promote interregional rela-
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tions (Ziyadov 2005). The TRACECA is designed to create, by the bypass of 
Russia and the revitalisation of the Medieval Silk Road, the shortest connection 
for the now independent CIS states toward Southeast Europe and the Mediterra-
nean, and also the Far East (primarily to the Chinese ports allowing an access to 
global trade, to the world sea – http://www.traceca-org.org). 
The trunk line of the “New Silk Road” is the section between the Georgian 
port, Poti and the city of Dostyk on the Kazakh/Chinese border, but its eastern 
connection allows an access to Lianyungang (and other ports) via Lanzhou in 
China, while it can be supplemented in the west by various European connections 
from the ports of train ferries navigating on the Black Sea – e.g. to Bratislava 
(Black Sea Region… 2012). 
In its Central Asian section there are two alternative routes from Baku across 
the Caspian Sea (Figure 2). The northern branch (via Aktau) is more advanta-
geous for the trans-Eurasian long-distance international transit and also for 
Kazakhstan, while the south branch, across Turkmenbashi, is more important for 
the southern and eastern part of Central Asia (Table 3), as it links almost half a 
dozen countries and also allows an access to Iran by its southern side branches. 
Figure 2 
Railways in the Caucasian section of the TRACECA 
 
Legend: 1 – Operating wide gauge tracks; 2 – Operating normal gauge tracks; 3 – Non-operating 
wide gauge tracks; 4 – Non-operating normal gauge tracks; 5 – Wide gauge tracks under 
construction; 6 – Normal gauge tracks under construction; 7 – Wide gauge tracks planned; 8 –
Normal gauge tracks planned; 9 – Year of completion of the railway; 10 – State border; 11 – 
Break of gauge at border crossing station. 
Source: Calculated by the authors on the basis of Jane’s World… 2010 and several other studies. 
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The infrastructure of both routes is just as obsolete. Non-physical barriers – 
especially bad management and operation – also contribute to the weak attraction 
of this corridor. The lack of coordination among the different means of transport, 
the lack of information and the heavily loaded ports in Baku and Aktau make the 
Caspian section one of the least reliable links of the corridor. 
In addition to this two-branch trunk line, there are many versions in the plans, 
as the different actors of the larger area of the TRACECA do their best to have 
the route versions most suitable for their own self-interests accepted. 
The geopolitically most sensitive (western) section of the TRACECA is the 
part between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea/Mediterranean Sea, due to the 
serious conflicts of the Caucasian countries both among themselves and with Tur-
key on the one hand, and because of its macro-regional hub role unfurling in the 
semi-global trade, considered as important by China, Iran, Central Asia and the 
European Union alike on the other hand. For the time being it is fanatical 
nationalism that blocks the making of reasonable and implementable decisions on 
the routes of the corridor in the Caucasian region, on the basis of compromises 
among the neighbour countries. 
Today it is only Georgia and Azerbaijan through which trans-Caucasian rail-
way traffic is free from hindrances (e.g. a direct “logistic express” service 
operates between Poti and Baku [Tschaidse et al. 2001]). To this line, however, 
Armenia can only join through Georgia, because both Azerbaijan and Turkey 
made the formerly unhindered traffic across the Armenian border impossible in 
1994 (Figure 2). This makes Armenia search other routes across Iran, towards 
the world seas (Jane’s… 2010. Armenia).  For creating a connection between the 
Georgian capital city and Turkey, the simplest solution would be to renew and re-
open the southern section of the Tbilisi–Gyumri–Kars railway through Armenia, 
established in the late 19th century. However, the international political forces 
aiming at the isolation of Armenia favour a bypass route that would directly link 
Georgia to Turkey, west of Armenia (Kars–Tbilisi… 2012). This Baku–Tbilisi–
Marabda–Akhalkalaki–Kars – BTAK – railway line, also supported by UNECE/ 
UNESCAP (Figure 2) has a great advantage of allowing Turkey to join in (Euro-
Asian Transport Linkages, 2012; Logistic Processes and Motorways of the Sea II, 
2012). For the creation of the southwestern route version across its own state 
territory, Turkey has two very powerful arguments: 
 the railway tunnel to be completed by 2015, running from Istanbul beneath 
the Strait of Bosporus (which makes the rather costly navigation on the 
Black Sea unnecessary), and 
 the fact that the land corridor can be integrated into the a PEN/TEN-T 
network through Istanbul, across the East Balkan, to the states of Central 
Europe, Greece, and also the other countries of the north shore of the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
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Using its geopolitically very advantageous geographical location and its me-
dium power status, Turkey tries to strengthen its transit role in trans-Eurasian 
goods transportation. For this effort of theirs, they found a partner in China, 
which wishes to reach Europe through Turkey, avoiding the politically risky 
trans-Caucasian route (Engdahl 2012). 
The construction of the TRACECA alternative through Turkey, however, is 
conflicting with the interests of Georgia which has a gateway role on the eastern 
shore of the Black Sea, as it would weaken Georgia’s role in transit. Georgia is 
thus trying to enhance its attractiveness, in addition to the railway reconstruction, 
by the intensive enlargement of its port capacities, increasing their role in sea 
ferry transport. As regards the non-directly interested states, the counter-
interested Russia sees that the New Silk Road is mostly advantageous for Western 
Europe – as a tool for intrusion into the markets of the Caucasian–Central Asian 
countries and for pushing Russia out. Accordingly, as a kind of monopolisation 
and amendment of the project, Moscow politicians – with a rather peculiar inter-
pretation – also consider the St. Petersburg–Moscow–TransSib–Kazakhstan rail-
way chain as part of the New Silk Road, arguing that this route is expected to 
manage a more intensive traffic and also promotes the connection to China 
(Lagerhauskette … 2006). 
As opposed to Russia, Ukraine has significant ambitions about joining the 
TRACECA, so it is even willing to participate in the construction of the BTAK 
railway, in order to bypass Russia (Ukraine und… 2007). 
Kazakhstan with its successful efforts to reach a leading role in Central Asia 
has a vested interest in reaching the Iran network by new railways starting from 
its Caspian (petroleum producing) region, in order to diversify its possible access 
routes to the sea. 
The railway networks of Azerbaijan and Iran have already been connected, 
and on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran 
(Gorgan) line will be completed by 2014 (Iran’s part… 2012). All in all, a 
“breakout”, an access to a warm sea also serves the interests of Russia, as it has 
been stated by the Russian government several times. 
Kazakhstan is trying to make the most use of its mediating/transit role, coming 
from its geographical location, in goods transportation between China and 
(Southeast/Southern) Europe. For Kazakhstan then, the southwestern connection 
allowing an access to the Mediterranean Sea through Turkey has also gained 
strategic importance. In this effort, not only Azerbaijan, but Georgia has also 
become a partner of Kazakhstan (Meeting… 2005). Kazakhstan is looking for 
alternative routes for its wheat export, weakening its dependence on the transit 
across Russia. For this purpose, the necessity to use the would-be BTAK railway 
creating an access to the ports of the Mediterranean Sea has also been raised 
(Patsuria 2012, Khankishiyeva 2012). According to the agreement between the 
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governments of Kazakhstan and Georgia, Kazakhstan would export cereals below 
the global prices to Georgia, in return for the reduced fees to be paid for the use of 
the railway of the Caucasian state (Kazakhstan to cease… 2012). 
As a matter of fact, two countries are masters of using the advantages coming 
from their central location. A real macro-regional, international turntable role is 
that of Azerbaijan. In the Baku region, the west-east TRACECA corridor, 
favoured by the successor states of the Soviet Union and also by Turkey, China 
and the EU, is crossed by a north-south, Russia–Central-East/South Asia corridor 
(Mamedov 2001). 
Kazakhstan has a turntable role in the traffic between Russia and Central Asia, 
and also between China and Central Asia, and China and Russia. In fact, Truel 
(2011) thinks it is not an exaggeration to say that the new capital city, Astana may 
become the new “logistic hub” of Central Asia, and this macro-region might join 
the global supply chain via this city. 
The so much needed development of the corridors briefly featured above is 
delayed mostly by insufficient financing and political opposition. Even the petro-
leum-exporting countries are unable to finance on their own the investments that 
have been planned since the 1990s. They are in bad need of external resources. A 
formal criterion of the access to these resources is the harmonisation of the quality 
management systems to ISS (International Standard System [Grytsenko 2010]) as 
soon as possible. External financing can be really successful if the support of 
those multinational financers is gained that consider the respective infrastructure 
projects as a part of the global network of routes. One of these potential financers 
is the Narvik seated “New Corridor AS” company which considers the Trans Sib 
as a part of the Eurasia–Scandinavia–Atlantic Ocean–North America intermodal 
semi-global transport chain (Figure 3). 
5 Traffic of the corridors, time and cost of transports in railway 
based container transportation 
5.1 The development of intermodal (combined) transportation – with special 
regard to the container block-trains 
Intermodal transportation is not only a possibility but also a necessity on the 
trans-Eurasian corridors, because of the geographical/network endowments. 
Factors making combined transportation indispensable include the impermeability 
of the Korean Peninsula, and the sea between Japan/South Korea and the Russian 
ports. A specific means of intermodal transport are train ferries on the landlocked 
seas (Caspian Sea and Black sea) and on the Lake Van. The most widespread  
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Figure 3 
The semi-global Asia–Europe–North America corridor 
 
Source: Nord-Ost-West Korridor… 2003. 
form of intermodal technology in the respective macro-region is container 
transportation. Of the total volume of container traffic between the Far East and 
Europe, 97% is managed on the peri-Eurasian navigation route across the Strait of 
Suez and only 3% is done on land, by the trans-Eurasian railway corridors. Of the 
total traffic of the latter, more than 75% is done on the TransSib system, the 
proportion of the Central Corridor is 21%, and that of the TRACECA is not more 
than 4% (Shipping Rates… 2008). The transportation of railway containers is 
done on some wagons of traditional cargo trains in the case of weak demand. On 
distances of thousands of kilometres, however, block-trains made up only from 
container-carrying wagons are more efficient, especially for the servicing of 
automotive and computer factories with large transport demands (Development… 
2012). 
In recent years, the supply of block-trains has multiplied – nor only as regards 
their frequency but also the destinations they connect. The trans-Eurasian block-
trains can be categorised into the following groups: those running 
 between port cities (e.g. Vostochny–Hamburg, Shanghai–Antwerp) with a 
21–30 day transit time; 
 between port and non-port hubs (e.g. Nahodka–Berlin, Hamburg–Beijing, 
Nahodka–Buslovskaia, Antwerp–Chongqing) with a 12–15 day transit 
time; 
 between non-sea port big cities (e.g. Lanzhou–Duisburg, Beijing–Berlin, 
Shenyang–Leipzig) with a 16–25 day transit time (Gresley 2011–2012). 
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The large-distance block trains that are much more expensive compared to sea 
transportation are still feasible because they usually transport technical equipment 
of high specific value, mostly in just in time system. (E.g. the city called 
Chongqing by the Yangtze River concentrates more than 20% of the world’s 
laptop, notebook and LCD manufacturing, the largest market for which is 
Western Europe. Trains running to the North Sea carry mostly chemicals on their 
return to China – RETRACK 2012.) 
5.2 Time and cost demand of container transportation  
The time necessary for the delivery of container goods to the railway destinations 
is determined by the category of the trains, the quality of the tracks, the speed 
depending on the traffic management and also by the waiting times due to 
different reasons. The average speed of the container trains is 50–80 km/h (on the 
TransSib trunk line it is 76 km/h), but the waiting times coming from all sorts of 
reasons maximise the distance done by the trains in one day at 800 (max. 1000) 
kilometres – which is not more, on the other hand, than 300–350 kilometres on 
e.g. the Kazakhstan section of the Central Corridor (Russian Railway… 2012). 
Cargo trains are the fastest on the Chinese sections. On the trunk line of the 
TransSib there are increased speed (express) container trains recently, managing 
1200–1300 kilometres per day. The transit time of containers has almost been 
halved since the 1970s/80s (compared to the latest express trains). (E.g. between 
Vostochny and Finland it was reduced from 21 days to 11.5 days, between 
Vostochny and Switzerland from 32 days to 17 days – Transit time from… 2012.) 
Transit time is varied, depending on the length of the respective corridors, the 
quality of the tracks, and also the mode of transportation (Table 4). 
Table 4 
Costs and transit time of a 20’ (feet) <16.5 ton container between Duisburg and 
Lanzhou on the different routes, with the two different transport modes 
Route In single wagons By block-trains 
USD days USD days 
TransSib–Kazakhstan route 6,730 28 3,200 18 
TransSib–Mongolia route 6,705 38 4,700 22 
TransSib–Manchuria route 6,705 39 4,600 20 
Source: Original source called “Freight tariff quotation for single wagon loads; consultants assess-
ment for block trains based on market prices 2011” published in Table 41 of the study on 
RETRACK. 
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As regards the cost of container shipment, the difference between sea naviga-
tion and railway was drastic in the first years of this century. The prices of con-
tainer shipment among the Asian and the European ports, however, almost dou-
bled in 2012 due to the declining traffic, increased fuel prices, natural disasters 
leading to the temporary closing of ports etc. (White–O’Neill 2012). Despite the 
increased costs, the price of sea transportation among the ports of Western 
Europe and East Asia is still only one third or half of the land transport price. If 
there is a need, on the other hand, for a transport not directly between sea ports 
but within a Far East sea port (e.g. Shanghai) and a landlocked European city (e.g. 
Berlin), the costs of combined transport are almost the same at those of the pure 
sea shipment. Between landlocked destinations far away from the seas (e.g. 
Urumqi and Berlin), container block-trains are the cheaper solution (Table 5). 
5.3 Development of the traffic volume on TransSib, results expected from 
technical improvements and operation 
As a manifestation of the process of the thawing of the political tensions and in 
order to increase currency revenues, in the early 1970s, when the Suez Canal be-
came unusable, the Soviet Union announced the railway service called Trans 
Siberian Container Service (TSCS) between the Far East and Western Europe. As 
an effect of the “discount tariff” applied by the Soviet railway company, the first 
peak of the container traffic was in 1987, in the time of the perestroika, with 160 
thousand TEUs. On the Japan–Western Europe route, the east to west transport 
was dominant in the 1980s and the early 1990s, primarily because of the export of 
technical devices. 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union changes took place in the eco-
nomic and political environment of container services, and also in the institu-
tional/organisational conditions. As a result of the recession in the Russian 
economy and foreign trade, the nadir of the container transport was in 1993, with 
30–35 thousand TEUs (Shirres 2011). The progress after this critical situation 
was induced by the start of the economic growth and the improvement of the 
containers/logistics services, on the one hand, and the state subsidy or the transit 
shipments and the armed protection of the trains, on the other hand. The shift of 
the container traffic induced by Japan from railway to the sea routes decreased the 
growth of the traffic of the TransSib from the mid-1990s, but the new interna-
tional automotive cooperations of different kinds still generated railway or com-
bined container traffic. There were years when 60% of the container traffic of the 
TransSib was already induced by South Korea (European Conference… 2005). 
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In the new century, the proportions of the respective actors (countries with 
transport needs) generating transit has been very hectically changing, due the 
changing pace of economic development and other reasons. Even in the early 
2000s, for example, there was a rapid development of traffic on the Vladivostok–
Vainikkala (Finland) route, generated mainly by the South Korean automotive 
industry (the volume of 124,473 TEUs in 2004 shrank to only 643 TEUs by 
2008). The volume of traffic generated on the TransSib by Japan is still neg-
ligible, as a large part of the country’s industrial production has been outsourced 
to faraway countries. 
The dominant generator of international container traffic on the TransSib is 
now China (Misharin 2008). The volume of the China–Russia railway container 
traffic is 135 thousand TEUs, well above the traffic generated by Japan and South 
Korea together. 
These days, the larger part of the total cargo traffic on the TransSib (an 
annual 200–250 million tons) is made by domestic traffic generated by the spatial 
division of labour among the regions and the supply of the population, but the 
volume of international traffic almost reaches this. Of the international traffic, 
however, only 0.5% (!) is transit traffic, while the proportion of export starting 
from Russia reaches 93%. The share of import to Russia – 6.5% – is negligible 
compared to the export. From container traffic, on the other hand, transit has a 
much more considerable share; still, it only holds position three, lagging far 
behind import and export shipments (Table 6). 
Table 6 
Breakdown of total and container traffic of the TransSib by directions 
(main routes), 2011 
Direction/type of traffic Volume of total traffica) Container traffic 
million tons % TEU % 
Export from Russia 90.2 93.0 142,048 39.0 
Import to Russia 6.3 6.5 189,540 52.1 
International transit 0.5 0.5 32,415b) 8.9 
Total 97.0 100.0 364,003 100.0 
Notes: a) – Data estimated by the authors, on the basis of 69 million tons of registered traffic in the 
first 8 months of 2011; b) – According to the homepage of the Trans Siberian Landbridge: 
10,000 TEUs in 2010. 
Source: Original: RETRACK Interview, Russian logistic experts December 2011 and Freight One 
OJSC Presentation on the 20th CCTT Plenary Meeting, Odessa, 22–29. 10. 2011, published in 
Tables 42 and 45 of the RETRACK study, some data of which served as the basis of calculation 
and compilation by the authors. 
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The total (domestic + international) container traffic of the TransSib reached 
749 thousand TEUs in 2010 (http://www.rail.co/2011/11/29/trans-siberian-land-
bridge), of which almost one half was international. 
Coming from these, by far the largest volume of cargo traffic on the border 
crossing stations along the TransSib flows through the Russian ports of the Far 
East (Vladivostok/Vostochny/Nahodka) – in 96% towards the sea. The second 
busiest is Zabaikalsk, the Russian border crossing station of the TransSib–
Manchuria side corridor, whose special characteristic among the border crossing 
stations featured in Table 6 is the dominance of the inward (western) flow 
induced by the Chinese export goods. Position three is held by a border crossing 
station of the TransSib–Kazakhstan side corridor, Grodekowo, where the number 
railway wagons leaving the country is more than twelve times that of the 
incoming wagons. The least busy is the border crossing station of the TransSib–
Mongolia side corridor, Naushki, where the number of wagons leaving Russia is 
approximately five times the number of wagons arriving at the country. 
All in all, only 5% of the total volume of the border crossing stations examined 
is towards the west (i.e. Russian import and transit) (Table 7). 
Table 7 
Volume of the traffic on the TransSib, measured at border crossing stations 
in 2010 
Direction 1000 loaded wagons across the following border crossing stations 
Zabaikalska) Naushkib) Grodekowoc) Far East ports total 
To the east 173 36 73 715 996 
To the west 13 7 6 26 53 
Proportion of return 
wagons, in % 
8 20 8 4 5 
Notes: a) – A total of 25.5 million tons in 2010 (of which 30% is Russian petroleum exported to 
China), of which 14 million tons by containers; b) – Container goods: 0.6 million tons; c) – A 
total of 12 million tons in 2010, of which 1.2 million tons container goods. 
Source: Freight Two OJSC, Presentation at the 20th CCTT Plenary Meeting, Odessa, 28–29. 10. 
2011. (Published as Table 44 in RETRACK 2012) Original data source of container goods 
unknown. 
The volume of trade between China and Russia was 15 million tons in 2006, 
which grew to 50–60 million tons by 2010, approximately two-thirds of which 
ran through the TransSib, mainly on the branch across Manchuria. 
The structure of goods dominated by mostly domestic demand is rather one-
sided, with a total of two-thirds weight of coal and petroleum/petroleum products 
with a low unit value in the total turnover, while the proportion of manufactured 
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industrial goods is only 3% (Freight Two OJSC… 2011). However, also in inter-
national relations, the TransSib is basically a corridor system oriented to the 
export of Russian energy carriers and other raw minerals, as well as lumber and 
metals. 
One group of factors influencing the volume and directions of container traffic 
and the change of the proportion of the respective actors is often changing, which 
makes the planning activity of the transport assigners difficult even in the medium 
run. The most important of these factors is transit tariffs, which are rhapsodically 
changing not only in Russia, but also in other countries. Occasionally, the 
intolerable transit tariffs of one country or another can make the traffic of the total 
of the corridor stagnate or even decline. (This included the unrealistic tariff for 
transit shipments introduced by Poland in the early 2000s.) In other countries the 
amount of VAT is unacceptable. In order to remedy these problems, the interests, 
resources and technologies of the growing number of market actors participating 
in the logistics chain during the container transit should be coordinated. The 
2000s saw changes in the circle of the market actors, namely the operators of the 
block-train services. Formerly, the RŽD (Russian Railways) had enjoyed an 
actual monopoly on the TransSib corridor, but now there are several foreign (Ger-
man, Belorussian, Kazakh etc.) public or private companies on the transport mar-
ket. 
The large number of hardly solvable traffic management/technological 
problems includes (due to the asymmetric nature of import/export volumes) the 
considerable difference between loaded and empty wagons, and wagons of 
different size by direction. The turnover of the ports in the Vladivostok region 
remains below their capacity, so it is not excessive traffic but the deficiencies of 
the organisation of loading, and even more so the lengthy checks concomitant 
with the excessive administration that make containers stay a day or two in the 
ports before they are loaded on trains (Russia’s Vladivostok… 2012). 
Results expected of the technological development and improved management 
of the TransSib may improve the conditions for combined transport. Since the 
completion of electrification along 2003, plans have been made for traffic with 
120 km/h block-trains in the total length of the railway line. (This would make the 
TransSib catch up with the speed norms specified for the European international 
trunk lines.) The technical parameters which may only be altered at huge ex-
penses include the inadequate height of the tunnels, which does not allow the 
shipment of containers loaded on top of each other. For this reason, trains on the 
East Siberian section can only carry one-third the number of containers trans-
ported in the USA. 
In order to reach competitiveness against the sea route, railway companies 
must spend on purchasing large (40’) containers, together with the purchase of the 
special railway wagons adequate for them (with extra loading capacity), and the 
 27 
railway stations must also be re-built in order to be capable of the loading of large 
containers. (Of the 49 loading stations along the railway line, only 13 were 
suitable for the movement of 40’ containers in 2005; by 2012 all of them were up 
to this task.) The transport market of the TransSib–Manchuria (in fact, the 
TransSib trunk line) would be significantly enlarged by a permanent railway 
connection between the two Koreas. 
The transit capacity of the TransSib does not only depend on technological 
developments but also on the organisation of traffic, the cooperation and joint 
efforts of countries interested in transit. In order to handle the international trans-
port problems, the International Coordination Council of Transsiberian Transpor-
tation was founded in 1993. The 80 founding members of this organisation 
include a one and a half dozens of railway companies that contribute to the im-
provement of the efficiency of this corridor (Russian Railways… 2012). 
In order to considerably decrease the time of container transit, the RŽD 
Company announced in 2009 the ambitious programme called “Tans-Siberian in 
Seven Days”. The implementation of the programme, with a total expenditure of 
11 billion USD, would allow a guaranteed maximum 7 days transit time of the 
container trains for the distance of 9000 kilometres by 2015. The realisation of 
this plan, however, is impossible without the decrease of waiting times. The 
simplification of administration and registry at the border crossing stations is 
served by electronic administration (introduced by Naushki among the first ones), 
single documents used in all countries (“On Transit”), but the plans also include 
the implementation of “green corridors” (Shirres 2012). 
From among the other trans-Eurasian corridors, we are only going to deal with 
a few characteristics generating traffic for the TRACECA. 
5.4 A few characteristics of the traffic on the TRACECA 
The traffic volume of the TRACECA is much lower than that of the TransSib, 
mainly because of the several interruptions (sea ferries, gauge breaks), and secon-
darily because of the smaller capacity of the railways and the more limited trans-
port demand of the underdeveloped region along the Central Asian southern sec-
tion of the route. The majority of the traffic is domestic or bilateral; international 
transit is weak for the time being. (With the exception of the Caucasian section: 
three-quarters of the railway transit traffic of Georgia are generated by the 
neighbouring Azerbaijan [Ezugbaia 2007].) The most intensive traffic is managed 
on the East Kazakhstan section, as a result of trade with China (Kazakhstan 
will… 2012), the weakest across the Caspian Sea and Black Sea interrupting the 
land corridor. On most sections of the TRACECA, westward flows are stronger, 
reaching 72–76% in the Caucasian region (Ezugbaia 2007). 
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Across the busiest border crossing station, Dostyk/Alashankau, a total of 11.3 
million tons of goods flowed to China in 2010 (half of this from Kazakhstan); in 
the opposite direction, 3.5 million tons of (predominately Chinese) goods were 
transported to Kazakhstan. The transit capacity of the Chinese–Kazakh border 
was significantly increased by the new Jinghe–Yining–Khorgos–Altynkul’ rail-
way operating between the two countries since 2010 (with a total traffic of 5.5 
million tons already in 2012) (Khorgos… 2012). The new border crossing station 
shortened the route from the Chinese border to Almaty by 520 kilometres (The 
Latest... 2009), increased the transit potential of Kazakhstan (especially in con-
tainer transport), and decreased transit time between West China and Europe 
(Kazakhstan and China… 2012). Of the total container traffic of the Kazakh–
Chinese border in 2010 (186 thousand TEUs), the strongest transit traffic is 
generated by China–Kazakhstan–Central Asia (50,100 TEUs), a significant part 
of which was made by shipments of parts between the automotive plants in South 
Korea (Pusen) and Uzbekistan (Abluk). The West China–Western Europe transit 
lags far behind this with its annual volume of 11–12 thousand TEUs (Rakhimov, 
2011/2012), although this also includes the flow of goods on the Chongqing–
Germany/Holland route (RETRACK… 2012). The Kazakh–Chinese cargo traffic 
is projected to reach 793 thousand TEUs by 2020, while the total cargo traffic will 
be 28.2 million tons in 2015 and 48.5 million tons in 2020. 
5.5 A brief summary of the risks of the peri- and trans-Eurasian 
routes/corridors 
The provision of the transit navigation route on the Artic Ocean is the economic 
interest of the Russian government at any time, due the incomes coming from the 
services offered on this sea (icebreakers, ports, navigation, meteorological/ 
hydrographical forecasts etc.). For this reason, this route has a low level of risk 
both with regards to politics, and the safety of shipments and life. 
Some sections of the southern peri-Eurasian (Suez) sea route (in Southeast 
Asia and the Gulf of Aden) are still risky for cargo and life to a limited extent, 
due the activity of pirates, but the presence of the navy ships of several interested 
countries can already minimise this risk in the near future. Although the political 
risk potential of the Suez Canal is high (depending on how often it is blocked by 
extremist political forces or war actions), the international powers interested in its 
operation are able to guarantee its operability within a short time. 
For trans-Eurasian transit transport, the route least risky from the political 
aspect is the trunk line of the TransSib. China and Russia will be even more 
cooperative in the future in the field of economy, due to their mutual dependence. 
Mongolia will probably not be the “Golden Apple of Discord” of China and 
Russia, either. This will keep the level of political risk low both on the TransSib–
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Manchuria and the TransSib–Mongolia side corridors. The same may be true for 
the TransSib–Kazakhstan side corridor (in fact, for the Central Corridor), as in the 
development of the relationship between China and Kazakhstan, the mutual 
economic interests are more important than the possible tensions coming from the 
religious/ethnic differences. 
What can be risky is the operation of the TRACECA corridor, especially its 
alternative track across the Trans-Caucasus and Turkey. In Central Asia, the 
southern route alternative close to Iran and Afghanistan may be the riskiest of all 
routes from political and ethnical aspects (despite the relative religious homoge-
neity), but the occasional natural disasters (earthquakes, wind-blown sand, storms, 
rock avalanches etc.), and also the unpredictability of the behaviour of some 
tribes increase the risk of transit. 
6 Alternatives for Hungary to join the trans- and peri-Eurasian 
corridors 
As regards the sea routes and land corridors introduced so far, for the foreign 
trade of the Carpathian Basin and within that Hungary, it is only the Suez sea 
routes and the TransSib corridor that have a real significance. Bulk goods and 
large shipments are almost exclusively container goods predominantly transported 
to Hungarian destinations on the sea route, bypassing Asia from the south. For the 
delivery of container goods, the volume of which is negligible compared to that of 
goods shipped on sea, transporters usually use the trunk line of the TransSib via 
Moscow. More than two-thirds of goods from Hungary flow through the mega-
ports of the North Sea (Hamburg, Antwerp, Rotterdam etc.), while the remaining 
one-third is managed by the ports of the northern Adriatic Sea and Constanţa. The 
ports of Bulgaria and Greece are very rarely used by Hungarian foreign trade. 
Why these are the ports through which Hungarian foreign trade to the Far East 
flows and what ports may become significant in the future is determined, and will 
be determined by the combined impact of several factors. 
6.1 “To the sea, Hungarians!” – but where? 
In the first half of the 19
th
 century, in search of relative economic independence 
from the Austrian Empire, Hungarian reform politicians tried to avoid the use of 
the port of Trieste. The Hungarian establishment agreed with Lajos Kossuth’s 
proclamation, “To the sea, Hungarians!”, but there were sharp debates on which 
non-Austrian ports should the railway lead to. The two main versions were 
Constanţa and the nearby Rijeka (Fiume), from which the latter was given a 
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(domestic) railway connection. From the late 19
th
 century on, Rijeka managed the 
major part of the Hungarian overseas foreign trade. The preference of the North 
Adriatic Sea was due to political and economic considerations in the first place, 
and at that time the transport geographical distance mattered a lot in the choice of 
the location of the port. 
In our globalised world – when (transport) geographical distance has lost 
much of its significance – it is a topical and hardly answerable question which 
ports may be the most suitable destinations for Hungary’s foreign trade with the 
Far East. To find the answer, we must take into consideration how the signifi-
cance of distances in different interpretations has changed in the globalising world 
trade and what impacts the new transport organisational/logistics systems have 
had on the choice of the destination ports. 
The significance of (transport) geographical distance, equal to the length of 
route to be managed by ships (in kilometres) has remained in those exceptional 
cases when both the production and the consumption of the shipped goods takes 
place in the destination ports, or their narrower catchment area. 
Economic distance, i.e. the choice of transport tool, port and route on the basis 
of costs incurred during transport, has been more important than geographical for 
quite a while. Transport expenses depend in the first place on the size of the 
transport devices and the ports, the average level of their utilisation, the intensity 
of traffic and the tariff policy of the transportation company taking all these 
factors (also influenced by competition) into consideration. Economic distance 
must be taken into consideration especially in the case of routes where both end 
points are landlocked (but at least one of them is), so goods to the destinations 
can only be delivered by combined transport. For the minimisation of costs, the 
choice of the port (with adequate land transportation linkages for import and 
export) is of vital importance. Economic distance may be up to 30–60% longer 
than transport geographical one if the route incurring the lowest costs is chosen. 
Coming from the fact that transport network distance is no longer an aspect to 
be considered in the design of the transport route, in fact, even economic distance 
is negligible, but the quality and diversity of logistic services are becoming the 
main criterion, and a new concept of distance, the logistic distance has been 
widely accepted. 
The main factors determining the logistic distance include in the first place the 
frequency of scheduled ship lines, and the number of shipping companies and port 
service providers available in the ports, and also the competition that they have in 
the quality of services. The second group of factors is made by port capacity, 
equipment for the loading and handling of special goods, and land/inland water 
connection to the hinterland. The total of the costs from the sender to the 
addressee (transport tariff, costs of port services, official duties and other costs) 
are only factors of tertiary importance, on the one hand because if the first two 
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factors are missing, then no transport can take place at all, and on the other hand 
because for transporters it is more important to optimise the delivery time of the 
shipment to preserve its consistency/soundness, and to have reliable services, 
which is considerably influenced by the traditional partnership between port ser-
vice providers and shipping companies. The accessibility of duty free zones, 
available in some ports only, may also be attractive. In sea navigation, a more and 
more important factor in logistic distance is the depth of water in the ports (and 
partly the length of the quays, and berths), which determine the size of the ser-
viceable ships. Mega-ships transporting the newest containers can only use a few 
ports for the time being, among which there is a larger “logistic distance” than 
among formerly used ports (suitable for the servicing of smaller ships). 
The vanishing dominance of the choice of ports based on geographical dis-
tance and transport costs is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the largest share 
of trade between Hungary and the Far East is not managed through the (Adriatic) 
ports in the vicinity of the sea route, but through the farther Atlantic rim, North 
Sea ports. 
The North Sea (Range/ARA) ports have reached, by the creation of a logistic 
system adapting to the globalising economy and favouring efficiency above all, 
and also exploiting their economies of scale, an unassailable advantage that have 
in many respects almost secured their monopoly in the field. Their highly 
developed and extra-high capacity infra- and suprastructure, their frequent ship-
ping on several routes, and the quality of their diverse services make these mega-
ports inimitable in Europe for a while. New, large capacity “heavy railways” 
(Betuwe, Iron Rhine) and motorways have been built towards their nearby catch-
ment area, the Ruhrgebiet, and the capacity of the formerly built railways and 
roads in their hinterland reaching right to East-Central Europe has been enlarged, 
while the attraction of the inland waterways has not decreased. 
With a view to the rising transportation costs (due to increasing fuel prices and 
other reasons) and the aspects of the environment, it would be reasonable in the 
future to provide the servicing of Hungary more and more from the geographi-
cally much closer Adriatic Sea and Black Sea (and maybe Aegean Sea) ports, 
which can be made attractive with adequate technical improvements. The realisa-
tion of this effort may be promoted by the spreading of the hub and spoke logistic 
system. The role of the Mediterranean hub may be increased in the future by the 
construction of huge Chinese distribution and logistic centres (in South Greece, 
on islands, in Sicily etc.), from where the Chinese export goods may be farther 
transported by feeder ships to the Balkan ports, and from these ports products 
could continue their journey on land routes to the Carpathian Basin. What extent 
this new goods flow will reach and how much it will decrease the traffic of the 
North Sea ports will basically depend on future economic growth, and also on the 
goods structure of the Chinese foreign trade to Europe. 
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For the Carpathian Basin (including Hungary), the ports of the landlocked seas 
and marginal seas of the Mediterranean (Adriatic, Aegean Sea, Black Sea) can 
serve as gateways. The leading ports in these seas are, both in capacity and 
volume of traffic, Trieste and Constanţa, but the ever sharper competition, the 
reconstruction of the railways leading to them, the construction of new 
motorways and the boom of inland navigation may change the capacity and the 
order of importance of the ports in the future. 
Although Constanţa is at a larger geographical distance from Budapest than 
Trieste, it has the great advantage of the adjoining Danubian waterway on which 
bulk goods can be cheaply transported, i.e. the economic distance is much smaller 
than that of the other ports (Table 7). It has a further advantage in having ample 
space for developments and it has traditionally good connections to Asia. Rijeka’s 
gateway potential and attraction for Hungary may significantly strengthen in the 
future if the mountain section of the Zagreb–Fiume railway is diverted to 
straighter lines with milder slopes, and if the transport capacity is significantly 
enlarged. The modern port of Koper will be able to keep its positions especially in 
container traffic. Ploče can be an important port for Hungary only if the 
infrastructure of Corridor Vc is constructed. (However, the construction of the 
motorway in Bosnia and Herzegovina, part of this project, seems to be unrealistic 
for the time being.) Thessaly has traffic below its capacity, but it has not been a 
regularly used port of Hungarian foreign trade since World War I. The least 
probable is the strengthening of the traffic between Bar in Montenegro and 
Hungary. The depreciated Belgrade–Bar railway is not part of any PEN/TEN-T 
corridor. Bar will not be competitive against Ploče in the combined (sea/land) 
transportation between the Far East and Hungary (Erdősi 2009). 
7 Technical, logistic and transport policy problems of Hungary’s 
joining the trans-Eurasian railway corridors 
For Hungary those trans-Eurasian corridors may be relevant to which the country 
can potentially join (the TransSib and the Central Corridor). (The TRACECA can 
only have a very much subordinate supplementary role even in the best case, irre-
spective of whether the European gateway of the route alternatives is Constanţa, 
Varna or Istanbul.) 
From Moscow to Western Europe (across Poland, Slovakia and Hungary), 
several international trunk lines join the TransSib. Of these, of outstanding 
importance is the TEN-T II (Nizhny Novgorod–Moscow–Minsk–Warsaw–Berlin) 
corridor railway. The trunk line [Moscow]–Kiev–Lviv–Krakow–Dresden/Berlin, 
across South Poland to Germany, forms Corridor III. The corridor railway marked  
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V.a to southwest from Lviv, to Uzhgorod–Chop–Čierna nad Tisou–Poprad–
Bratislava, is the main line for the joining of Slovakia (Figure 4). 
The Hungarian normal gauge railway joins the European extension of the 
TransSib at Záhony (the wide gauge railway extended to Hungary across the 
Tisza River from the Transcarpathian town of Chop). Goods reloading in the 
years following World War II was limited to the station of Záhony and served the 
Soviet army in the first place, and also the management of the war reparation 
transports from Hungary. By the intensification of the Soviet–Hungarian foreign 
trade, Záhony more and more became the scene of bilateral goods exchange after 
1949. For the development of heavy industry in Hungary, a growing volume of  
 
Figure 4 
East-Central European international railway corridors joining 
the TransSib in Moscow 
 
Source: Edited by Erdősi, 2012. 
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coke, iron ore, crude iron and composition metals came from the Soviet Union. 
Also, the Hungarian textile industry, paper and wood industry acquired their raw 
materials form the east in the first place. In return, Hungary transported raw 
materials of foods, canned foods, fruits but also buses and machinery on this 
railway (Bajor 2009). 
The volume of bilateral goods exchange reached 4–5 million tons as soon as in 
the middle of the 1950s, and Záhony was not enough for the movement of goods. 
The reloading capacity had to be enlarged, and so from 1957 to 1965 an 
approximately 28-kilometre long reloading zone was created by the extension of 
the wide gauge railway beyond the border. Traffic volume reached 13.6 million 
tons by 1979. Despite the number of government decrees made on the processing 
of the imported raw materials on the spot, no location of significant industrial 
plants was made, just as no waterway was constructed on the Tisza River that 
could have been integrated into the transport of imported mass goods (Bajor 
2008). 
The slowing down of economic development slowly decreased the traffic in 
the reloading centre already in the 1980s. In the 1990s Hungary turned its back to 
Russia and the states of the CIS (the foreign trade of the country has had a strong 
Western European orientation from that time on), which shrank the traffic of the 
reloading centre to just one-third. Although the market of the CIS has become 
more significant in the recent years, the traffic of the reloading centre, despite the 
growth, was in 2011 still only a quarter of the peak in 1979. Although the 
Hungarian governments theoretically supported the location of industry and the 
foundation of industrial parks in the reloading zone in the 1990s and 2000s, only 
moderate achievements have been made. Meanwhile, the railway infrastructure 
and the reloading equipment became rather obsolete, so they are in need of 
renewal or replacement in accordance with the new technological requirements. 
The importance of foreign trade to the CIS region and the Far East (especially 
China) is in all probabilities going to increase, together with the role of Záhony in 
international goods transportation. The contiguous European motorway network 
is now only 60 kilometres away from the town. If the motorway is constructed 
right to the border to Ukraine, the role of land transportation will increase in the 
land traffic generated by the reloading centre in Hungary. As the chance of the 
construction of Ukrainian section of the motorway is negligible in the foreseeable 
future, international road transportation can only moderately decrease the propor-
tion of the railway from total traffic. 
The traffic of the East Hungarian reloading zone – generated by transit traffic 
in the first place – can be influenced by the competitors operating in the neighbour 
countries. 
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7.1 Competitors of the Záhony district 
Only a few reloading centres were established at the western/southwestern border 
of the former Soviet Union, all of which had an intensive traffic. After the 1990s, 
the border was opened at a number of new places for railway traffic, but their 
turnover is low, and reloading usually takes place at the border crossing station 
(Figure 5). The overwhelming majority of these stations (in Poland or Romania) 
have no real impact on the Hungarian east–west transit. Even the railway 
reloading station in Sighetu Marmaţiei, west of the Carpathians, in the Ukrainian–
Romanian–Hungarian triple border region, mainly serves Western Romania, and 
to a lesser extent (by transit) Serbia, Macedonia and Greece. 
Among the neighbour countries, the most direct competitor of Záhony in the 
mediation of transit between Eastern and Central–Western Europe is the nearest 
reloading station operating in the Slovakian Čierna nad Tisou. This reloading 
centre is located only 8 kilometres from Záhony as the crow flies, but its advan-
tage is due not to the better quality of its technical infrastructure but to the fact 
that transit transport is much cheaper across Slovakia than across Hungary. 
The reloading centre in the Southeast Polish Medyka/Przemyśl and the railway 
running to Krakow from this place has hardly had any impact on the transit traffic 
of the Hungarian reloading centre (and the east–west and northeast–southwest 
transit traffic in Hungary), because it predominantly carries transit traffic 
generated by Germany and the Atlantic region of Western Europe, and to a 
smaller extent also by the north region of the Czech Republic. 
7.2 Possible impact of the wide gauge railways planned in East-Central 
Europe on Hungary 
In the major reloading zones of the surrounding countries (similarly to Hungary), 
the wide gauge railway was built to a length of 8–10 kilometres (e.g. Corridors II, 
III and IX) on the Polish and Romanian side. In addition to these short sections, 
the smooth supply of heavy industry with raw materials necessitated in two 
countries the construction of long wide gauge railway sections to the centre of the 
country. 
From the border crossing station Hrubieszów in Southeast Poland right to the 
edge of the Silesian industrial region, to the railway station of Sławków 
Południowy/Olkusz situated only 30 kilometres away from Katowice, a wide 
gauge railway was built in 1979. This railway line (with its almost 400 kilometres 
length), unmatched in East-Central Europe (and which had no passenger traffic 
originally), was necessary for the transport of Soviet iron ore to metallurgy plants in 
Poland and sulphuric ore (pyrite) to the Soviet chemical industry on the way back. 
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Figure 5 
Railway border crossing stations at the meeting point of wide- and normal gauge 
railway networks 
 
Legend: a) – Breaks in gauge; b) – Border crossings of international significance; 
c) – Main international railway lines. 
Source: Authors’ construction. 
 38 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the transport of these minerals across 
the Ukrainian border dropped to almost zero and the domestic transport of coal 
was not significant, either. 
By the intensification of the Ukrainian–Polish trade relations, the turnover of 
this special railway grew from 4.4 million tons in 2001 to 8.6 million tons by 
2007 (Erdősi 2010a). This dynamic growth, however, had an unbalanced structure 
as regards transport directions. As opposed to the negligible volume of West–East 
traffic, the import of mass products (mainly iron ore) transported from Ukraine 
makes the bulk of the turnover. (The precious Polish pyrite is now mainly sold – 
at a higher price – in Western Europe – www.pkp-lhs.pl) 
In Czechoslovakia, the railway connecting the Ukrainian Uzhgorod to 
Banovce was eliminated after World War II. Between the two World Wars, this 
had been the track on which southeast-northwest long-distance domestic transport 
was conducted (when Transcarpathia, now part of Ukraine, belonged to 
Czechoslovakia). Instead, Čierna nad Tisou became a new border crossing station 
and a reloading centre was established behind it. 
In the vicinity of the second biggest city in Slovakia, Košice, a metallurgy plant 
was built in the 1960s that had no raw materials within the country. From Mate-
jovce next to the border of Ukraine to Haniska, an 80-kilometre long wide gauge 
railway was built in 1960, which transported iron ore and coke without reloading 
from the Soviet Union. This railway was electrified in 1978. 
Induced by the favourable tendencies of trade among the CIS countries (in-
cluding Ukraine) and East-Central Europe, plans have been made for the 
enlargement of the wide gauge railway network to west by substantial new sec-
tions: 
 In Slovakia besides the important trunk line running from Košice to 
Bratislava, across Poprad in the north, or in the south, close to the border, 
right to the hydroelectric plant on the Danube River in Gabčikovo, and also 
to Bratislava. 
 The continuation of the former line to Linz in Austria (for the supply of the 
VOEST metallurgy plant in Linz with iron ore); 
 Extension of the already existing South Polish wide gauge railway to the 
Czech–Silesian heavy industry centre, Ostrava. 
These railways are expected to transport raw materials from the east to their 
nearby regions at a lower price than the present ones, as there is no need for 
reloading. Also, the manufactured goods and agricultural products could reach the 
eastern market with better conditions. The relocation of the reloading centres into 
the foreground of Western Europe can be advantageous for both the operators of 
the transit and other beneficiaries (industrial plants). The new reloading places 
would be built with efficient and environment friendly technologies up to the 
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requirements of the 21
st
 century and the reloading activity at their destinations can 
have a favourable impact on local/regional employment as well. (It must also be 
taken into consideration, on the other hand, that the stations along the Ukrainian 
border will be nothing more than simple stops after their reloading functions are 
lost.) 
As a response to these challenges of the neighbourhood, in Hungary too an 
idea has been raised for the construction of the Záhony–Budapest–Gabčikovo–
Bratislava wide gauge railway. 
For Hungary, however, a country with scarce resources of raw materials and 
energy carriers, it is a basic economic issue to become the transport/logistic 
centre of East-Central Europe. The country does not only need the incomes 
directly deriving from this, but also the revenues coming from the industrial 
processing of a part of the transported raw materials. The wide gauge railways to 
be built may have a detrimental impact on Hungary’s position within the trans-
port network of the macro-region. Hungary thus has to seriously consider the 
consequences of the foreign investments described above. 
7.3 Transport geographical endowments influencing the chance 
of the competition for the Central European transport centre role 
The geometrical centre of the network of the main railway lines of Central 
Europe, as it can be seen in Figure 6, is the Vienna/Bratislava region, the most 
easily accessible from all directions. Within the more advanced regions located 
west of this, connections are excellent, but there are serious deficiencies in the 
east. On the eastern side, it is either north or south from where the network can be 
acceded, and for a connection one must travel almost to the centre of the network. 
This macro-region (also including the Balkan Peninsula) has no outstanding 
economic centre. In the northern part of this macro-region, Budapest and Prague 
are not in the hubs of the network but in the centres of smaller regions created by 
partial networks. By the “distortion” (relocation) of the lines of the network, 
however, these capital cities may find themselves in a relevant position. 
In connection with the China–Europe relation (direction) transports we may 
ask the question whether the line of this network starting from the Adriatic Sea 
can be relocated towards Budapest or not (Figure 7). 
A starting point for finding the answer is the Peace Treaty of Trianon. 
Hungary then acknowledged the right of Czechoslovakia to freely transport its 
trains from Bratislava to the Adriatic Sea (to Rijeka) across Western Hungary and 
on the two transverse lines meeting at the Murakeresztúr hub on the southwestern 
(Yugoslav) border. This obligation meant in practice that the former two 
Hungarian railways and the Austrian Semmering railway running from Vienna 
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Figure 6 
Model of the Central European transport network 
 
Source: Edited by Tibor Bajor. 
Figure 7 
The Adriatic port–Vienna line and its network environment 
 
Source: Edited by Tibor Bajor. 
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also to the sea (at Trieste) were intertwined (in the territory of the present 
Slovenia) in a away that they cut off other Hungarian railways from the sea and 
integrated the West Hungarian railway line into the Austrian East Alpine trunk line 
(Figure 8). 
Some of these transport routes have become parts of the TEN-T network, on 
the recommendation of Hungary. These lines, however, were transferred by MÁV 
(Magyar Államvasutak, Hungarian Railways Company) for operation to the 
Austrian–Hungarian private railway company in 2011. In addition, these lines are 
the main lines of the Austrian owned Rail Cargo Hungaria to the ports of the 
north Adriatic Sea. This way, Hungary practically abandoned the utilisation of the 
economic advantages offered by these ports and also becoming the location of 
distribution/processing of goods arriving from China on the sea. 
From a transport logistical point of view it is worth noting that the shipments 
from the North Adriatic ports have their shortest connection to the Danube River, 
the main axis of Central European river transportation (the corridor TEN-T VII) 
at Vienna and Bratislava. Taking the above described transport network into 
consideration, the forwarding of goods coming from the Adriatic ports can use the 
multimodal railway, waterway and aviation infrastructure of the two (nearby) 
capital cities and also in the region of the hydroelectric plant at Gabčikovo. 
While Hungary is not competitive on the aforementioned line, a logistic chain 
built on this, coming from the Far East, would be an excellent contribution to 
strengthening the logistic role of this region in Europe, in accordance with the 
interests of Austria and Slovakia. Such a situation would lead to the birth of a 
commodity logistics concentration with an extremely strong attraction. This 
would in itself have really negative consequence for Hungary. 
The handicap of such a situation would be enhanced by the construction of the 
560-kilometre long wide gauge railway (www.iho.hu) to Bratislava. As a 
consequence of this, Hungary (with the exception of the western counties) would 
find itself on the eastern side of the Central European logistic region (Figure 9), 
outside the European transport connections and in the interest zone of Russia 
again. 
If the wide gauge railway is built in Slovakia, the distribution centre of the 
goods transport from the Far East and Russia to Europe will be relocated 
(“moved”) from the Ukrainian hubs to the west, from which the Slovak and 
Austrian companies will profit. In this case there will be not one single reason for 
the East–West railway transport to stop anywhere is Hungary. If this 
Vienna/Bratislava commodity logistics axis is realised, the model of transport 
network featured in Figure 3 will be distorted to the detriment of Hungary. The 
southern line (Adriatic ports, West Balkans) will strongly gravitate towards 
Vienna. The north line will slightly move towards Bratislava and may divert some 
of the traffic of the Berlin–Warsaw–Minsk route. Most drastically, the eastern line  
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Figure 8 
Railway lines and their connections listed in Article 306, Chapter V. 
of Act No. XXXIII. of 1921 
 
Source: Edited by Tibor Bajor. 
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Figure 9 
Impact of the construction of the Slovakian and Hungarian wide gauge railway 
 
Source: Edited by Tibor Bajor. 
would be distorted, as the role of Kyiv would be taken over by Bratislava. In this 
case, Budapest would have significance equal to that of the Ukrainian ex-
distribution centres within the Far Eastern, Russian and European transport 
system. The importance of Budapest could only increase if significant transport 
were realised on the TRACECA corridor and that would be diverted toward 
Bratislava. 
It is clear from the initial Figure 6 that the existing network can most 
reasonably accessed from Moscow in the north and from Istanbul in the south. 
The southern TRACECA route version will not be a major accession point in 
the near future, due to the present Central-Eastern/Caucasian political situation. 
However, we must be prepared for a changed situation, e.g. by the economic 
expansion of Kazakhstan (Figure 10). 
It is the central, east–west line of the network demonstrated in Figure 1 that is 
presently running across Hungary. Because of their locations in the TEN-T 
network, Bratislava and Vienna restrict the possibilities of Budapest (Figure 11). 
Furthermore, Poland is trying to divert the transit traffic from Kyiv to Hungary at 
Lviv, and integrate it into the traffic of Corridor VI at Katowice (Perspektivy… 
2002). If Hungary does not make determined steps, it will be completely pushed 
out of the east–west transit traffic. 
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Corridor X.a (the Zagreb–Maribor–Graz route) allows the bypassing of 
Hungary in a northwest–southeast direction. From Záhony to Italy, the majority of 
transportation takes place across Sopron. The traffic across all other border 
crossing stations is negligible. This is in line with the transport interests of ÖBB 
and Rail Cargo. Sopron, where cargo shipments are collected and distributed, is a 
hub of the GYSEV. The Záhony–Hodoš (Slovenia) block train has not met the 
expectations so far. For the time being, there are negotiations on having approved 
 
Figure 10 
The logistic role of Kazakhstan 
 
Source: Edited by Tibor Bajor. 
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Figure 11 
The TEN-T network in the Carpathian Basin and its region 
 
Source: Edited by Tibor Bajor. 
a North–South European transport corridor, linking the Baltic Region to the Adri-
atic, by the countries concerned (Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, Austria, Slove-
nia, Croatia). For this, the Katowice– Žilina and the Vienna–Graz section must be 
approved as parts of the TEN-T. In practice, the connection between the Baltic 
Region and the Adriatic Sea is already an operating transport corridor (European 
Commission 2007). This north–south corridor, however, diverts the Southern 
Europe–Russia traffic to Austria before reaching Croatia, already. 
The best solution for the accession to the axis in the north is Moscow–Minsk–
Warsaw–Berlin axis (one of Europe’s most important railway lines). 
It must be clear now that the amendment of the network system featured above 
for the favour of Hungary is not an easy task because of the similar efforts of the 
competitors. Along the ideal line of transport from the Far East to Hungary, there 
are several states in between that assert their own interests. 
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Starting from China, the first significant actor and distribution region is 
Kazakhstan. Already in this country, Hungary must do its best to attract as much 
of the traffic as possible: on the one hand, by having shipments arriving there with 
Hungary specified as a destination; on the other hand, by the organisation of 
direct block trains and the promotion of the opening of “bases”. Although it 
cannot be forecasted precisely as yet when the Asian section of the TRACECA 
becomes a busy transit route, it should be adequately guaranteed well in advance 
that Hungary becomes the main destination in Europe. 
However, if the Yekaterinburg–Narvik–Atlantic Ocean–North America semi-
global transport chain (Figure 3), connected to TransSib, is implemented, then a 
significant part of the shipments from the Far East will not even enter the Central 
European network. This is against the interests of not only Hungary but also the 
other countries of Eastern Europe, and even Germany. It takes joint action to 
counterbalance this grand plan. 
The railway on this route runs from the Ural Mountains, from Yekaterinburg 
to Moscow, but from Chelyabinsk to Kharkiv in Ukraine. If Russia approves the 
use of the trans-Siberian route, the crowdedness of the Moscow hub could be 
significantly decreased, but this would also weaken the position of Poland. On the 
other hand, this line could be joined by the Caucasian region from the south and 
thereby new partners could show up for the Hungarian foreign trade. 
The last large logistic centre, the last large turntable before this line reaches 
the Eastern European region is Moscow, a gateway of two corridors of the Central 
European network (II and IX), and the north-eastern destination of the TEN-T 
network. (If Hungary accepts the recommendation of Russia and proposes that the 
destination of Corridor V of the TEN-T network should be Yekaterinburg instead 
of Kyiv, the capital city of Russia will be much less capable of distortion towards 
Hungary.) The implementation of the Záhony–Moscow “logistic bridge” is 
unrealistic, because of the excessive turnover of Moscow. Russian initiatives for 
the omission of Moscow (e.g. the Záhony–Yekaterinburg direct connection) have 
failed due to the passivity of Hungary. 
The Poles, focusing on their own interests, try to attract some of the East–West 
transit and thereby divert the eastern lines of the network model northwards. 
These initiatives are disadvantageous for Hungary, because the shipments to 
South and Southwest Europe would reach their destinations by bypassing 
Hungary from the west (partly diverted to Corridor VI), through Slovakia (or the 
Czech Republic/Austria). 
The amendment of the network evidently most dangerous for Hungary is the 
construction of a wide gauge railway, on Slovak and Austrian initiative, from the 
Ukrainian border to the Bratislava region (or even farther west). This new line 
would practically isolate Hungary from the centre of the network. It would be just 
as dangerous if Hungary constructed on its own territory the Russian wide gauge 
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railway, because this way it would deprive itself of the possibility to become a 
centre – from the own resources of Hungary –, subordinating the country to the 
Vienna/Bratislava centre. If Hungary implemented a Chinese logistic centre in the 
hinterland of a neighbouring centre abroad (e.g. in Vas county or in the 
Szombathely area), the consequences would be similar. (Not to mention that the 
construction of a new commercial airport there cannot be justified with any 
argument, given a number of unutilised airports, suitable for the reception of 
cargo flights, all over Hungary.) Hungary, nevertheless, must pay attention to the 
“funnel effect”: where and in what direction the mouth of the funnel will be 
opened (Figure 12). In Version I of the east to west transportation, goods run 
across Hungary without stopping and meet the Slovak-Austrian logistic system at 
the western border, with traffic exerting its impacts in that region. In Version II, 
shipments are stopped on entering Hungary and will have impacts for the whole 
territory of the country. For Hungary it is evidently Version II that is desirable. 
Figure 12 
The “funnel effect” in Hungary 
 
Source: Edited by Tibor Bajor. 
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7.4 Possible means of decreasing or preventing of network 
distortions/threats dangerous for Hungary 
By adequate economic and organisational measures, Hungary may be able to 
create a network meeting its own expectations, advantageous for the country. 
The final European location of the exchange of Russian and Far East goods 
has not been found yet. Countries suitable for this role are afraid of one or the 
other foreign trade partner, on the basis of their historical experiences. They only 
want to play a mediating role if the three concerned partners implement their 
foreign trade through them, using their mediation services. Of course this is mu-
tually unacceptable for the three trading partners. A country, on the other hand, 
that is the first to guarantee a joint location for all three partners with the same 
conditions (simultaneously to not blocking the direct relations among the part-
ners) and does not come up with unrealistic economic claims will probably have 
an indispensable position in the network. Russia has had intentions to implement 
the European–Russian trade through Hungary three times so far (in 1940, 1945 
and 2003). 
The presence of the market in itself is necessary but not sufficient condition. In 
accordance with the transportation policy of the EU, all railway transportation 
companies (registered and operating with permission in the Union) must be pro-
vided the same access to the use of the tracks. If Hungary, at the entrance point of 
the Union’s network, founds a Hungarian–Russian–Chinese joint railway trans-
portation venture (maybe with Austrian, Ukrainian or German participation), pro-
viding the necessary background for this, then the country can become a centre of 
not only the Central European network but also of the Far East–Europe transcon-
tinental network. The Hungarian effort thus shrinks the eastern side of the Central 
European network and moves the location of the centre eastward. In this case 
Hungary can become an intercontinental transport hub, one of the main economic 
activities of which is transport logistics and commercial logistics. 
The Hungarian government is unable on its own two break out of the forced 
position in the European–Asian (within that: Central European) transport net-
work. This causes considerable economic damages for the country. Since the 
1990s, when the role of Záhony was consciously depreciated, for political 
considerations, the intercontinental transit routes have been gradually moving 
away form Hungary. The former transport logistical roles of the Hungarian cen-
tres are gradually taken over by Vienna and Bratislava. (The positions of Buda-
pest have worsened recently even in air transport against the above two capital 
cities.) This makes the revision and amendment of the government decisions of 
the recent years necessary. It is a vested interest of Hungary to provide Hungarian 
transport companies with a direct access to the sea navigation routes, and also to 
divert the Asian and Russian transport routes towards Hungary, parallel to the 
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provision of direct economic relations. In cooperation with the Austrian ÖBB, a 
railway transportation company should be registered in Hungary, together with 
the railway companies of Russia, China and other Far East countries. The EU 
regulations would entitle such a company to carry out transportation services with 
its own railway vehicles in the whole of Europe. This would safeguard, among 
other things, interoperability. 
If the attempt to change the present position of Hungary fails, then the “New 
Silk Road”, becoming busy in the future, will run far from the country, and the 
destination of the East-Central European section will be Vienna. 
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